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Attempts to pin down the slippery concept of agency have 
generated debate in nearly every humanities discipline, and the 
discipline of rhetoric is no exception. Debates within the field have 
produced two competing visions of rhetorical agency. The first is a 
“traditionalist” picture. Within this view, rhetorical agency is 
possessed by an individual subject whose persuasive efforts are 
aligned with her intentions; she is “in charge” of her rhetoric, which 
may or may not have the desired effect of shaping the perspectives 
or actions of others.  
The traditionalist picture of agency bears a similarity to the 
ways in which physicians-as-rhetors have been imagined in the 
context of Western biomedicine (Segal, 2005; 2007). Physicians 
doled out “Doctor’s Orders,” sometimes succeeding in their 
attempts to shape the attitudes and behaviors of patients, 
sometimes not. Either way, physicians were considered the engines 
driving the rhetorical encounter.  
Recent work on the concept of rhetorical agency considers the 
possibility that the field has historically oversold the rhetorical 
agency of the “speaker” and undersold the rhetorical agency of the 
“audience.” After all, an audience’s prevailing desires and 
expectations “bend the will” of the speaker at the same time that the 
speaker attempts to bend the will of the audience (Leff, 2003). New 
technologies have also begun to blur the notion of rhetorical agency 
and have invited a number of nuanced engagements with the 
concept,1 but discussions of rhetorical agency still center to some 
                                                    
1 Technological advances in medicine have further complicated 
notions of human agency and have led to nuanced analyses, such as Scott 
Graham’s exploration of the agentive role played by brain imaging 
technologies in validating the ontological status of contested disorder 
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extent on the fundamental questions of what constitutes rhetorical 
agency, who possesses it, and when, where, and for whom is it 
constrained. This essay shifts attention away from the concept of 
rhetorical agency and towards what I am calling here the “rhetoric 
of agency.” These appeals to individual agency have persuasive 
force. Simply pointing out that someone can do something (i.e. has 
agency) can be a way of subtly suggesting that one should do that 
thing. Discourses of health and medicine provide an entry point for 
considering the rhetoric of agency.  
In the last century, the list of things that one can do in order to 
preserve or promote one’s health has grown alongside the list of 
things that one is socially and often morally expected to do. The 
striking scope and moralization of health discourses and practices 
have given rise to a phenomenon known as “healthism” (Crawford, 
1980; 2006). That health is thought of as an unqualified, 
universally desirable state serves to obscure much of the moral 
work performed by contemporary health-talk (Metzl and Kirkland, 
2010). (After all, who wishes to be unhealthy?2) The pursuit of 
health has become a part of everyday life that is taken up more or 
less reflexively. As the setting of that pursuit migrated, in many 
instances, from the doctor’s office to the home office,3 there has 
been a surge of interest in, and respect for, “patient agency” in 
public and professional discourses of health and medicine.  
“Patient agency,” it should be noted, is something of a 
contradiction in terms. The etymological roots of “patient” denote 
gestures of submitting while the roots of “agency” emphasize a state 
of doing. Within the biomedical paradigm, physicians have been 
viewed as the active, healing agents and patients as the receptive, 
passive audience (Stone, 1997). Physicians working within the 
advent of the biomedical paradigm, according to Judy Segal, 
“sought explicitly to deprive patients of the sense that they could 
                                                                                                                                                                    
fibromyalgia—something patient advocate groups had been trying to 
accomplish for decades (Graham, 2009). In a similar vein, Carolyn Miller 
examines automated forms of assessment for writing that have become 
commonplace in standardized testing and are currently being developed 
to assess public speaking performances. Miller points out that whether or 
not such technologies are embraced will depend, to some extent, on how 
rhetorical agency is conceptualized (Miller, 2007).  
2 See Jennifer Malkowski’s article, “Beyond Prevention: Containment 
Rhetoric in the Case of Bug Chasing” for an example of the public 
discourse surrounding the (anti)-health practice of intentionally pursuing 
HIV through sexual contact (Malkowski, 2014).  
3 A 2012 Pew survey reports that 74% of adult Internet users in the 
U.S. have sought health information online.  
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look after themselves” (Segal, 2009, 364). Now, however, 
physicians often seek to instill within patients a sense that the 
opposite is true: that they are the active agents of their own health. 
As medical innovation has transformed a number of acute illnesses 
into chronic conditions—one of the great successes of 
biomedicine—patients have been increasingly relied on to monitor 
their own conditions and administer their own treatments 
(Martins, 2005). As a result, the notion of the submissive patient 
seems outmoded at best and a relic of medical paternalism at worst. 
Attributions of agency concerning the maintenance and 
improvement of health have begun to shift to patients themselves 
within a web of agency-related terms like “patient empowerment” 
and “patient participation.”  
This article examines the rhetoric of patient agency at play 
within public discourses of health and medicine and in medical 
humanities scholarship. I argue that despite increased salience, the 
concept of patient agency remains vague and is capable of being 
operationalized and moralized in ways that escape attention. To 
illustrate this, I chart the rhetorical dynamics of the concept in 
public discourses of health and medicine. In so doing, I find that 
patient agency tends to be rhetoricized as one of three 
(overlapping) patient capacities: the capacity to know, the capacity 
to prevent, and the capacity to decide. 4 Ultimately, I suggest that 
the rhetorics of patient agency can be deployed to cultivate health 
subjectivities that are imbued with untenable notions of individual 
control. These three rhetorics, and notions of control therein, 
constrain rhetorical opportunities for making sense of the 
(inevitable) bodily and environmental contingencies that 
characterize our lives.  
“IF I DON’T KNOW, I CAN FIND OUT”: PATIENT 
AGENCY AS THE CAPACITY TO KNOW  
In contemporary Western societies, health-talk has become a 
prominent tool for the shaping of self-identity, and one of the 
dominant “terministic screens” through which we peer to 
understand, and monitor, our selves (Burke, 1964). The pursuit of 
health, comprised of an increasingly diverse array of health 
practices, has become one of Western society’s principal symbolic 
practices (Crawford, 2006; 2009). A central component of this 
                                                    
4 Here, I use the term “rhetoricize” to denote the process by which a 
concept, term, or idea is rhetorically configured, or more simply put, 
made rhetorical and deployed in public discourses to take on a persuasive 
life of its own, as rhetors contextually adapt and adjust it.  
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journey toward health is the acquisition of health information. 
Robert Crawford explains that, “Individuals are expected to be 
knowledgeable. Large numbers of people eagerly seek out health 
information and the media oblige them in devoting extensive 
coverage of health matters and offering advice on a variety of health 
concerns” (Crawford, 2006, 402). Displaying fluency and eloquence 
in the languages of health and medicine functions as a form of 
social currency, helping to cultivate socially desirable health 
subjectivities.5  
 With the advent of Internet health and its affordances, 
including information-seeking, information-sharing, and health 
tracking tools, fresh avenues have been opened for shaping and 
reshaping health subjectivities. Internet-based discourses have 
become a primary tool for public engagements with health and 
medicine, as ever more users become members of online fora, add 
comments to web pages, and check the symptom boxes of online 
diagnostic quizzes (Keränen, 2014). While we tend to 
underestimate the extent to which health information was available 
prior to the Internet, one quality of Internet-based health 
information is unique: “apomediation,” or, the lack of mediation 
through “traditional” medical information gatekeepers (Segal, 
2009; Eysenbach, 2008). In the past, this traditional gatekeeping 
task might have fallen to a publishing house or a physician. Debates 
about the roles played by traditional medical gatekeepers were at 
the heart of the women’s health movement of the 1970’s. At that 
time, women campaigned for health information that was more 
widely accessible, and relevant to wider demographic groups (Kline, 
2005). Without access to relevant health information, women’s 
health advocates argued, opportunities for the agentive engagement 
of patients (especially those from marginalized groups) were 
severely limited.  
The accessibility of the Internet for health-related purposes has 
come to represent not only convenience (as it means less time spent 
in the waiting room), but control. A recent survey of online health 
seekers reports that, “Our findings show that Internet users 
perceive themselves as more competent and in control” as a result 
of having sought health information online (Lemire et al. 2008, 
136). This sense of user control is not merely a byproduct of 
Internet health; it is considered a desirable and necessary 
                                                    
5 For more on the social desirability of certain health subjectivities, 
see Jonathan Metzl’s and Anna Kirkland’s introduction to Against Health 
(Metzl and Kirkland, 2010).  
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ingredient for making “empowered consumers.” In an article cited 
over one hundred times, Leonie Segal states that,  
[C]onsumers require more than information to 
contribute effectively to decisions about their own 
health. Consumers also require confidence and 
competence to act on information and a capacity to 
influence the services they access. This requires an 
understanding of their own health…and acceptance of 
responsibility for decisions about their own health care. 
Consumers need to become empowered (Segal, 1998, 
31).  
By this measure, the so-called “empowerment” of consumers is well 
underway. According to a 2012 Pew Internet Project Research 
Report, 72 % of U.S. Internet users say they have sought health-
related information in the past year. Over 30 % of U.S. adults say 
that they have searched for information to identify a medical 
condition that they or someone else might have, and 18 % say 
they’ve gone online to find others who share their health concerns 
or conditions. In interpreting the meaning of their survey results 
for the public, Pew Report uses a number of bolded headings to 
characterize the attitudes of Internet-users, using “patient-
reported” speech.6 One heading, in summarizing survey results 
pertaining to health-seeking practices, states, “‘I don’t know, but I 
can try to find out’ is the default setting for people with these 
health questions” (Fox, 2012). Another heading used says that, “‘I 
know, and I want to share my knowledge’ is the leading edge of 
health care” (Fox, 2012). Placing the survey results under these two 
headings, the Pew Report draws upon the rhetorical salience of 
patient agency as the capacity to know: when people don’t have 
salient medical knowledge they can find out and when they know 
they are able to track and share. This presumed capacity to know 
constitutes both the “default setting” of Internet-health users and 
the “leading edge” of health care.  
A common Internet-health practice that has become particularly 
fraught for medical humanities, health communication, and media 
scholars (not to mention health care professionals) is seeking and 
                                                    
6 In a recent article, “Textual Standardization and the DSM 5 
‘Common Language,’” Patty A. Kelly defines patient-reported speech as 
“a speech intersection between two authors or speakers, where one 
reports the voice of another” and says that it represents the intersection of 
two contexts: “the reported context (prior discourse) and the reporting 
context (the current iteration)” (Kelly, 2014, 176).  
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tracking health risks.7 In a society whose layers are deeply 
permeated by risk discourse, it is not surprising that the Internet 
has become a tool for acquiring information about risks to health 
status (Beck, 1994). “Lifestyle risks” have become buzzwords. As 
Kay Richardson points out, “Consumer/citizens of the late 20th and 
early 21st century have been invited to apprehend life as a 
hazardous enterprise and to pay attention to news and information 
about public health issues so as to make lifestyle choices from an 
informed position” (Richardson, 2003, 171). When used for health-
seeking purposes, the Internet affords the opportunities (not to 
all—the digital divide persists) to track down not only common 
health threats, but also personalized threats to health-status 
through the use of interactive tools. One of these is the pervasive 
online health quiz.  
One can hardly visit a health information site such as 
Webmd.org without encountering popups for self-administered 
diagnostic quizzes that advertise themselves by posing a question 
such as, “Do you know your risk of X disease?” Self-diagnostic 
questionnaires pertaining to mental health are of rhetorical interest 
in particular, since these tests measure symptoms that are complex 
and not always physically obvious. These have become 
commonplace; when conducting an internet search for the term 
‘depression,’ the first two related search terms to appear are 
“depression quiz” and “depression test.” After answering a series of 
questions pertaining to moods and behaviors, the user is typically 
presented with a “risk profile.” These risk profiles are comprised of 
categories the range from “Low Risk” to High Risk.” Low-Risk users 
are encouraged to repeat the test in two weeks, paying special 
attention to moods and behaviors in the intervening time. There is 
not a “No Risk” category and so the test suggests that vigilance is 
warranted. A continued demonstration of agentive health 
behaviors, such as tracking down and continually monitoring 
                                                    
7 White and Horvitz have argued that the Internet can leave users with 
a distorted sense of health risk, since an internet search for a common 
symptom like “headache” does not result in a list of results ordered 
according to likelihood (White and Horovitz, 2009). Often, the top search 
results pertain to severe and rare conditions, not the commonest ones. 
They coin the term “cyberchondria” to refer to the ways in which Internet 
use can propel users toward tendencies of hypochondria.  
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health hazards, is the prescription for those living within risk 
categories. This includes, ostensibly, everyone.8  
In the context of contemporary health-talk, the pursuit of health 
entails knowing our risks. In the age of Internet health, there is 
always more knowledge about health risks that can be sought. 
These risks come in all forms, from food to sex to cavity fillings. As 
the realm of things that one can know about the body expands, the 
Socratic notion that all knowable things are worth knowing is 
strengthened. The task of the agentive patient, then, grows longer 
and longer with every freshly publicized risk factor and every new 
screening test that becomes available. When rhetoricized as the 
capacity to know, a paradox of patient agency is that with every new 
piece of knowledge one becomes increasingly aware and fixated 
upon that which is not yet knowable. In this sense, increased 
knowledgeability about health-status (and especially, risks to it) is 
accompanied by a deeper understanding that not all risks are 
knowable. The knowledgeable patient is aware that the task of 
tracking down and indexing this knowledge is ongoing and even 
infinite. As a result, knowledgeability gives rise to a phenomenon 
that Crawford terms a “the spiral of anxiety and control.” He says,  
Health-conscious people live with the knowledge of a 
gap between prescriptive advice and what one actually 
does or can do. They also live with the knowledge that, 
no matter how much one complies with the rules of 
health, dangers far exceed the personal capacity for 
protection through lifestyle changes and other 
preventive actions and that still more dangers remain 
hidden or soon to be discovered (Crawford, 2004, 507).  
In this spiral of anxiety and efforts to control, attempts to quell 
worry through the acquisition of knowledge leads to renewed worry 
about threats that lie in wait, yet to be discovered, which in turn 
leads to additional attempts to quell the heightened anxiety through 
knowledge acquisition.  
When patient agency is rhetoricized as the capacity to know it is 
arguably the case that the knowledgeable patient-agent reaches an 
epitomized form, ironically, in the much-maligned medical figure of 
the hypochondriac. The hypochondriac is constantly tracking 
symptoms, asking questions such as “What sorts of physical 
sensations am I experiencing and what am I to make of them?” and 
                                                    
8 For more on these self-diagnostic quizzes, see Kimberly Emmons’ 
Black Dogs and Blue Worlds: Depression and Gender in the Age of Self 
Care (Emmons, 2009).  
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tirelessly seeking out knowledge about risks to health-status. Not 
only this, the hypochondriac is highly knowledgeable about the 
nature(s) of medical knowledge and expertise. Catherine Belling’s A 
Condition of Doubt: The Meanings of Hypochondria argues that 
the hypochondriac, despite lacking claim to substantiated evidence 
of medical threat, cannot ever be proven wrong once and for all 
(Belling, 2012). There are always possibilities, however slim, of 
which the hypochondriac is keenly aware, that her ‘negative’ test 
results are false negatives, that the symptoms that plague her have 
not yet been medically categorized as an illness, that her time-
constrained physician is failing to notice a vital piece of 
information. Furthermore, the hypochondriac’s central assertion 
and greatest fear—that she is dying, that she can never be entirely 
“in control” of her body—is an assertion about which she is 
‘objectively’ correct. While the rhetoric of patient agency as the 
capacity to know suppresses consideration of bodily contingency in 
favor of discourses and practices that emphasize bodily control, we 
cannot escape the former by focusing only on the latter. Inevitably, 
we will all have experiences in which our bodies seem to be evading 
our control and defying our will.  
“MY CHILDREN DON’T NEED TO FEAR THEY 
WILL LOSE ME”: PATIENT AGENCY AS THE 
CAPACITY TO PREVENT 
When patient agency is rhetoricized as knowledgeability, it is never 
too far from a second rhetoric of patient agency: the capacity to 
prevent. What is the knowledge of risk good for if not for 
preventing the materialization of risks? In the last several decades, 
the technological means for early detection and monitoring have 
expanded dramatically and so, too, have the scope and frequency of 
recommended screening tests. Even patients without symptoms or 
family histories suggestive of heightened risk are encouraged to 
undergo annual screenings for various ailments since, as the saying 
goes, “An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure.” In the 
context of preventive medicine, even the ‘healthiest’ individuals are 
rendered into what Nikolas Rose has termed “prepatients” or those 
“existentially healthy” individuals who have come to be understood 
as “asymptomatically ill” (Rose, 2007, 19-20).  
For ‘prepatients,’ a lack of symptoms or of family histories that 
suggest heightened risk does not necessarily negate the need to stay 
on the alert. The patient who actively seeks out this knowledge, in 
the name of risk-mitigation and prevention, is often described as 
and lauded for “becoming educated” and “taking control” of her 
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risks and thus of her life.9 “Education” and “control” are implied to 
be not only laudable goals, but responsibilities. This sense of 
responsibility for preventing risks from becoming reality is a dual 
responsibility: It is something that one “owes” to oneself and to a 
collective that consists of loved ones and the greater public. Given 
that screening and detection are tools that help systemically 
manage health care costs, prevention has become a collective 
interest. The actions taken to prevent are thus imbued with an 
ethical quality, since caring for oneself amounts to caring for 
others.  
One area of preventive medicine where this dual responsibility 
becomes especially pronounced is genetic screening. These 
screenings are commonly used to assess risk for ailments like heart 
disease, various cancers, and other diseases both rare and 
commonplace. Direct-to-Consumer Genetics has made accessing 
these tests even easier, given the appropriate finances. One can 
simply order the test and have it delivered to one’s home, where the 
test is taken and sent back to a laboratory for screening. Usually, 
the individual needs only to swab a piece of cotton in the mouth 
before sending the sample to a laboratory. Some time later, the 
consumer will receive a report about his or her genetic 
predispositions and risk factors. These tests identify a range of 
genetic predispositions that a patient has, from breast cancer to 
sickle cell anemia and many other conditions rare and common. 
These tests are marketed directly, typically without any 
governmental regulation or oversight, to consumers in the form of 
television and radio advertisements, and most often the Internet. 
These tests have been thought to bolster patient agency, 
particularly since they circumvent the sort of institutional 
involvement that could lead insurance companies to increase 
premiums or terminate coverage (Majdik, 2009; 2011). Conversely, 
some argue that this lack of regulation might ultimately undermine 
patient agency because it might mean that test results are relayed 
carelessly to users, or that the test results themselves might be 
inaccurate (Lynch, 2011).  
Enthusiasm over the potential of genetic testing was not always 
as pronounced as it is now. Initially, the birth of genetic testing was 
met with caution about problematic future uses. Would this genetic 
knowledge be used to engineer the ideal child, for instance? A sense 
of unease about genetic power has dimmed, but not dissolved 
                                                    
9 For instance, see the framing of the following Mayo Clinic article on 
diabetes prevention: http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/type-2-diabetes/in-depth/diabetes-prevention/art-20047639.  
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entirely. Early fears about how genetic power might eventually 
“control” us and our endless human appetites for enhancement 
have not gone away entirely. It seems, however, that the pendulum 
has swung in the opposite direction (Coors, 2003). Now, we more 
often think of genetic power in terms of how we can use it to put 
ourselves in control via risk detection and mitigation rather than 
the other way around.  
Within the discourses of genetic testing, especially Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic testing, the concepts of control and personal 
responsibility come to the forefront. In their exploration of the 
metaphorical language used to describe genes and genetics in 
public discourse, Celeste Condit and Deirdre Condit argue that the 
desirability of the “recipe” metaphor for genetic testing (as opposed 
to the “blueprint” metaphor) comes from its “implicit appeal to an 
active human agent in control of the process” (Condit and Condit, 
2001, 34). The recipe metaphor implies that we rather than our 
genes are the ultimate determiners of our destinies. Despite the 
uniqueness of our genetic codes, our genetic destines are linked. 
The knowledge we acquire about our genetic predispositions will be 
translated into courses of action that have an impact on others. As 
Carlos Novas and Nikolas Rose explain,  
When an illness or a pathology is thought of as genetic, it 
is no longer an individual matter. It has become familial, 
a matter both of family histories and potential family 
futures. In this way genetic thought induces “genetic 
responsibility”—it reshapes prudence and obligation, in 
relation to getting married, having children, pursuing a 
career and organizing one’s financial affairs (Novas and 
Rose, 2000, 486). 
The sense of dual responsibility implied by the rhetoric of patient 
agency as the capacity to prevent recently became a topic of public 
discussion when actress Angelina Jolie published a letter in the 
New York Times. The letter, entitled “My Medical Choice,” 
explained her decision to undergo prophylactic double mastectomy 
after learning that she had a genetic predisposition for breast and 
uterine cancer. In the letter, she defends her decision by, in 
essence, gesturing toward the dual responsibility that prevention 
has come to entail, stating, “I can tell my children that they don’t 
need to fear they will lose me to breast cancer… I want to encourage 
every woman, especially if you have a family history of breast or 
ovarian cancer, to seek out the information and medical experts 
who can help you through this aspect of your life, and to make your 
own informed choices” (Jolie, 2013).  
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The public response to this letter was overwhelmingly positive. 
Letters to the editors of the New York Times tended to emphasize 
Jolie’s bravery, empowerment, and generosity, both in the decision 
itself to undergo the double mastectomy and the decision to 
publicly share her experience and knowledge with others. One of 
the few exceptions to the public embrace of Jolie’s statement came 
from musician and breast cancer survivor Melissa Etheridge, who 
expressed her opinion to Washington Blade (DiGuglielmo, 2013). 
According to her, Jolie’s choice was rooted in fear, not bravery. The 
evolution of genetic screening methods and preventive treatments 
will inevitably make the distinction between “fear-based” and 
“bravery-based” choices hotly contested rhetorical ground, and will 
force consideration of what exactly one becomes an agent of when 
making these choices: an agent of empowerment or an agent of 
anxiety?  
 When patient agency is rhetoricized as the capacity to prevent, 
it complicates ingrained Western notions that our health 
subjectivities are individuated, bounded, and autonomous. Yet the 
rhetoric of patient agency as the capacity to prevent implies a range 
of other people who merit consideration when we make healthcare 
decisions for ourselves. This, in turn, might imply that our health 
subjectivities aren’t so individuated after all—they are bonded. The 
rhetoric of bonded health subjectivities has democratic appeal, and 
could be deployed to argue that we should take better care of one 
another by, for instance, promoting wider access to affordable 
health care. But in public discussions of health care policy (e.g. 
“Obamacare”) the social dynamics of health have more often been 
instrumentalized as a tool for arguing that those with “preventable 
illnesses” or “lifestyle illnesses” are “draining the system” with their 
irresponsible decisions. 10 After all, so the logic goes, they are 
ultimately “in control” of their own health destinies, and that could 
have made other choices. Within the rhetoric of patient agency, the 
“could have” lapses often and subtly into the “should have.” While 
preventing health risks from materializing is framed as a matter of 
social responsibility, the failure to do so is a personal failing. This 
moralization of preventive health products and services can become 
especially problematic when considering the democratic 
accessibility of these products and services. It is possible that the 
rhetorics of prevention will continue to obscure questions of cost 
and accessibility. In this case, preventive treatments will become 
                                                    
10 See, for instance: 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Diet/story?id=3683683. This is an old 
topos, going back to the heyday of eugenics a century ago.  
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yet another of the many health “dividing practices” that reinforce 
stratification between those who are well-equipped to promote 
their overall health-status and those who are not.  
 “RESTORING A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND 
CONTROL THROUGH CHOICE”: PATIENT 
AGENCY AS THE CAPACITY TO DECIDE  
The rhetorics of patient agency as the capacity to know and the 
capacity to prevent overlap with a final rhetoric of patient agency: 
the capacity to decide. Charges of paternalism and power 
asymmetry have long plagued the medical profession, voiced 
notably by sociologists, rhetoricians, and feminist theorists. 
Sociologist Elliot Freidson argued that medicine has been the 
dominant profession, mostly because of its freedom from market 
dictates, and that other professions have attempted to model 
themselves after its autonomy (Freidson, 1970). In the heyday of 
medicine’s professional dominance, a doctor’s decisions were 
thought to be orders handed down to patients, not dialogues to be 
had with them. Some have begun to question whether such a period 
of intense professional dominance and paternalism ever truly 
existed outside of the scholarly literature, but it seems clear 
enough—especially given the body ‘compliance’ literature11—that 
patients have long been imagined as passive, inert bodies whose 
main options are either to comply with or to defy doctors’ decisions, 
as opposed to authoring decisions on their own terms (Coburn, 
2006).  
The rhetorical dynamics of medical decision-making have 
shifted considerably since the days of “doctor’s orders,” perhaps at 
least in part, for the oft-claimed purposes of ‘returning power’ back 
to the patients, but perhaps, too, for other reasons, such as 
administrative concerns over legal liability and employers’ interests 
in shifting a greater burden of insurance costs to their employees.12 
Regardless of underlying motivations, the concept of patient-driven 
decision-making has generated much discussion, especially as it 
concerns two of the most significant medical events of an 
individual’s life: birth and death. These have become events over 
which the patient is now given greater decision-making 
responsibility than in decades past. Patients are encouraged, and in 
                                                    
11 See Segal for a description of the rhetorical shift from compliance to 
concordance (Segal, 2007).  
12 See Crawford for more about how the current economic climate has, 
in part, helped transform “health-talk” into “responsibility-talk” 
(Crawford, 2006).  
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some cases required, to make decisions mediated by a simple sheet 
of paper regarding their preferences to receive or decline various 
technological interventions during labor and end-of-life care.  
In the context of end-of-life care, patients in some hospitals are 
given worksheets called “Patient Preferences Forms.” After 
consulting with physicians, they are asked to choose, often in 
conjunction with or under the guardianship of family members, 
whether they would like to receive treatment such as antibiotics, 
transfusions, defibrillation, tube feedings, intubation, chest 
compressions, etc. Up until the 1970s it was the case that physicians 
were primarily responsible for selecting from these options in 
private bedside or hospital room conversations with patients, their 
families, and sometimes other colleagues. Lisa Keränen has 
carefully explored the rhetorical problematics of these forms and 
the ways in which they reflected and facilitated the shift toward 
patient agency. She says, “Patients, prodded by the autonomy 
movement, and administrators, activated by the bottom line, called 
physicians’ previously unassailable authority into question” 
(Keränen, 2007, 374).  
While it seems difficult to argue against giving patients greater 
agency and choice in the context of a decision as intimate and 
irrevocable as end-of-life care, the Patient Preferences Worksheet 
can rhetorically delimit patients’ options for making sense of the 
dying process. The Patient Preference Worksheet, according to 
Keränen, “is deployed in the name of promoting patient autonomy 
and encouraging sound medical decision-making, [but] the 
Worksheet frames decisions as matters of technological as opposed 
to moral agency, and cultivates a radical restructuring of deathbed 
subjectivity” (Keränen, 2007, 372). This radical restructuring of 
deathbed subjectivity ultimately limits the vocabularies through 
which patients and their families can think and speak about dying 
and of what constitutes a “good” death. 
Patient-authored birth plans function in ways that are similar to 
the “Patient Preferences” worksheet. Birth plans allow expectant 
mothers to indicate which medical treatments they prefer to receive 
or decline in the event of childbirth. These choices include 
treatments such as fetal monitoring, pain relief, epidural, 
episiotomy, etc. On its webpage, the American Pregnancy 
Association (APA) suggests that one of the primary functions of the 
birth plan is “to restore a sense of confidence and control.” 
Restoring patients’ sense of control is important because, as APA 
explains, “During childbirth, many women feel like they are losing 
control. A birth plan helps many women maintain their focus and 
regain a measure of control even if unexpected events occur” 
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(“Creating Your Birth Plan,” 2015). When authoring a birth plan, 
the page suggests that women draw upon, “the power of positive 
thinking...instead of making a list of what you don’t want, use 
words like ‘we hope to’ or ‘we plan to’ or ‘we anticipate.’” Women 
are dissuaded from using negatively framed terms such as ‘we don’t 
want’ or ‘we won’t use.’ Despite its purported benefits of restoring a 
sense of control and choice, however, the APA’s suggestions for 
filling out the form undercut those very benefits by stipulating the 
sorts of control and choice that are preferable. In this case, ‘we’ 
language suggests that control over the event is not exclusive but 
shared, ostensibly with a partner and/or medical personnel. 
Additionally, women are encouraged to minimize the degree of 
conviction of their choices by using qualifiers like ‘hope to’ rather 
than ‘do not want.’ 
The rhetorics of decideability embedded within the birth plan 
prompted Monica Crossley to conduct an autoethnography of her 
own childbirth experience in which she mediates upon the false 
notion of choice with which expectant mothers are presented. She 
states that,  
In order for me to have made a genuine choice in this 
process, a number of conditions would need to have 
been fulfilled… First, I would need to have had genuine 
desires and preferences. Second, I would need to have 
had an understanding of the situation I was in and the 
options open to me. Finally, I would need to have had 
some means or technique of weighing up the potential 
outcomes and arriving at a decision (Crossley, 2007, 
558).  
The mere availability and utilization of birth plans as well as Patient 
Preferences worksheets does not guarantee that any of these three 
conditions will be met. What about the patient without an 
understanding of the situation and the possibilities open to him or 
her? Like the Patient Preferences Worksheet, it is possible that the 
birth plan constrains choice by offering certain kinds of choices. 
The technical, institutionalized framing of the birth plan, with its 
emphasis on technological intervention, obscures other factors of 
the birthing process that might be important to patients. What, too, 
about the patient who does not fulfill the first criterion: the patient 
without genuine preferences or desires? In other words, how do we 
account for the patient who prefers not to choose? In a scenario 
such as this, the patient who seeks expertise and guidance but is 
offered instead a platter of under-contextualized options could, 
according to Colleen Derkatch, damage the patient-physician 
relationship and “compromise individuals’ feelings of control and 
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confidence over their states of health” (Derkatch, 2010, 145). The 
rhetoric of patient agency as the capacity to decide makes it difficult 
to consider a patient without preferences.  
These examples illustrate that while many contemporary 
medical practices are purportedly designed to ‘restore power’ to the 
patients and liberate them from the past sins of an overly 
domineering and paternalistic medicine, the effects are not always 
experienced as empowering. For example, Crossley explains that 
after being admitted to the hospital, despite having authored a birth 
plan which stated a preference for home birth, she “didn’t sleep, but 
just felt the sense of relief flood over me—at last, someone was 
taking things out of my hands and I could allow myself to ‘let things 
go,’ if only because that’s what the medical staff were telling me I 
had to do” (Crossley, 2007, 553). In this case, being relieved of the 
obligation to decide came closer to fulfilling her true “preferences” 
than did the birth plan that was designed to promote them. When a 
stated preference is not followed because of some unforeseen 
circumstance or complication, it can seem as though the author has 
somehow “failed” to live up to her own medical decisions. Likewise, 
when a chosen preference leads to an undesirable medical outcome, 
the weight of the decision might feel as though it is resting solely on 
the patient’s shoulders. Just as the dictate to choose can sometimes 
be disempowering, the freedom from having to choose can be 
liberating. Within the rhetoric of patient agency as the capacity to 
decide, however, the notion that freedom from choice can be 
liberating is incoherent. The patient who prefers not to choose loses 
access to the language of patient agency.  
CONCLUSION: TOWARD BALANCING A SENSE 
OF CONTROL WITH A SENSE OF THE 
CONTINGENT  
Kenneth Burke has said that contradictions in terms, like “patient 
agency,” are always worthy of attention, because they reflect 
contradictions in our lived experiences (Burke, 1964). Each of the 
three rhetorics of patient agency described in this essay come 
packaged with notions of control that, when pushed to the limit, are 
paradoxical, if not contradictory. In the case of patient agency as 
the capacity to know, the patient becomes knowledgeable through 
the acquisition and tracking of threats to health, which can result in 
anxiety, which is itself a threat to health. While medical literature 
suggests that the active acquisition of health-information is a 
practice through which consumers become “empowered,” it is also 
a defining practice of the hypochondriac. Within the rhetoric of 
patient agency as the capacity to prevent, one’s unique, 
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individuated health risks, especially one’s genetic risks, are 
translated into a matter of collective concern and responsibility. 
When patient agency is rhetoricized as the capacity to decide, the 
obligation to choose can actually feel disempowering; sometimes, 
freedom from having to choose feels more liberating.  
The rhetorics of patient agency identified here are all, at root, 
concerned with the promotion of control: control through 
knowledge, control through prevention, and control through choice. 
One antonym of “control” is “chance,” and it is undeniably the case 
that much of what happens to our bodies results by chance, 
through contingencies over which we are not always able to exercise 
control. Many of our health practices and much of our health 
discourse is structured around the continued denial of 
contingencies. After a mastectomy, for instance, women will usually 
be offered the option of a prosthetic breast. Unlike a limb, this 
prosthetic will serve no “practical” function like walking or 
grasping, but it will serve a function nearly as important: to restore 
an impression of the body’s controllability in a society in which 
control is an important ingredient in the cultivation of desirable 
health subjectivities.  
Arthur Frank describes the rare virus that caused his near-fatal 
heart attack as highly contingent. This virus, he points out, could 
have acted otherwise. And this sort of contingency characterizes 
nearly all of the most-feared conditions with which we might 
someday find ourselves afflicted (Frank, 1995). Malignant tumors 
start off as ‘normal’ cells that do not die when they are supposed to 
and start to produce new cells when the body does not need them. 
These cells could have acted otherwise. Strokes result from the 
disturbed behavior of blood that could have acted otherwise. While 
the rhetorics of patient agency persuade us that we have ultimate 
control and responsibility over our bodies and health, at some point 
in our lives the ultimate uncontrollability of our bodies will be made 
apparent to us.  
The rhetorics of patient agency merit continued scrutiny on the 
part of rhetoricians and other scholars of communication. We 
should continue to ask ourselves how and in what circumstances 
these rhetorics allow for the increased moralization of health 
discourses and practices. Furthermore, we should question to 
whom these forms of patient agency (and the time and cost they 
entail) are likely to be inaccessible. In other words, we should 
continue asking: who is well-equipped to become “an agent” of 
her/his own health given current conceptualizations of patient 
agency, and what does this mean for those who are ill-equipped? As 
we remain mindful of these questions and continue to scrutinize the 
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rhetorical dynamics of patient agency, we might begin to imagine 
new rhetorics of patient agency, especially those that allow for the 
acknowledgment of contingency. Feminist scholars, among others, 
have already begun rethinking agency as relational, as a property 
that arises from and is embedded and exercised within a web of 
social relationships (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Thinking of 
patient agency in this way might help to mollify some of the more 
problematic aspects of patient agency as described throughout this 
essay, including the tendency to obscure consideration of who is 
well-equipped to become an agent and who is not, as well as the 
underlying implication that we have ultimate control as individuals 
over our health when we know that factors outside of our control 
can affect our health in important ways. As the shifting medical 
landscape promises to continue complicating notions of patient 
agency, rhetorical scholarship promises to regard these 
complications as important opportunities for rhetorical invention.  
Copyright © 2016 Ellen Defossez 
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